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Notes and Comments
Reform of the Law of Evidence in
Criminal Cases

J. A. Coutts*

1. History
Events surrounding the recent proposals for the reform of the
English law of evidence in criminal cases may be thought to
afford a cautionary tale, indicating the wrong way to engage in
public debate upon such matters. In 1964, the Home Secretary
asked the Criminal Law Revision Committee to review the law
of evidence in criminal cases. Before its Report 1 was published
(some eight years later), and, indeed, before the Home
Secretary had himself received it, there occurred a flood of
critical comment in the Press and on radio and television, and
questions in Parliament, on what were thought (not altogether
accurately) to be the main recommendations about to be made.
Those very critics who had thus jumped the gun then proceeded
to blame the Committee itself for what had happened, on the
ground that its work had not been sufficiently 'open' to the
public. This seems to be less than fair to the Committee, since
its task was publicised in the Press and in Parliament and the
public were invited to comment; the Committee consulted
those bodies likely to be interested and obtained the assistance
of experts from overseas (among whom Professors Edwards,
Friedland and Tollefson of Canada are mentioned in the
Report).
When the Report was at last published, on June 27, 1972,
the Home Secretary undertook to study it and any views
conveyed to him, as "a framework for early and necessary
reform", and asked for such views by October. This caused a
storm of protest from most interested bodies, who complained
that insufficient time had been allowed for consideration and,
more particularly, research. The Minister of State at the Home
*J. A. Coutts, M.A., LL.B., Pro-Vice-Chancellor, University of Bristol.

1. Criminal Law Revision Committee. Eleventh Report. Evidence
(General). Cmd 4991.
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Office then conceded that, although he would be content to
receive "preliminary views" by that date, other views could be
expressed later. With this postponement of the Government's
decision to introduce a Bill to Parliament, the first round seems
to have gone to the pressure groups, as some of them were
quick to remark.
The Committee's proposals, which most observers think
will tilt the balance of a criminal trial to make it less favourable
to the accused, have caused the reaction that might be expected
from the self-appointed professional guardians of our civil
liberties. And the language of these critics has at times been less
than restrained. The Committee's purpose has been described as
that of simply increasing the number of convictions. It is said to
be part of a massive assault on our liberties, part of a deliberate
campaign against the individual. Its proposals are stated to be a
threat to the things which give British justice a good name and
are even seen as a prelude to an attack on the jury system and
the right of appeal. The Committee has been accused of
double-talk and double-think and of hysteria (no less) - and
that by a critic who thinks the proposals will "encourage the
use of torture".2 The proposals have been thought (inaccurately) to reverse the presumption of innocence and to compel the
accused to enter the witness-box, and have been stigmatised as
one of the longest steps backwards the criminal law has taken
for many years. We have had a clarion call to eternal vigilance, 3
although, as the Lord Chancellor has drily remarked, it is hardly
enough simply to cry 'Wilkes and Liberty!', these days.
It would, however, be idle for the Government to pretend
that all criticism is of this kind. The Chairman of the Bar
Council has said that "many of those most experienced in
criminal procedure have grave misgivings"; and the President of
the Law Society has reported a "strong reaction" to the Report
in his branch of the profession. How, then, does it come about
that a long, technical, closely-argued Report on a subject of
such complexity and difficulty should so soon rouse the
suspicious of so many? There are, it is suggested, both a general
and a particular reason.

2. 116 Solicitors Journal 623.
3. 116 Solicitors Journal 493.
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English pride in their peculiar form of democratic
government and in the common law is traditional. If support for
the former is now less than enthusiastic in some of the countries
to which it was exported, belief in the latter is, perhaps for that
very reason, the more cherished. But the world's approbation of
the common law seems, on examination, to be founded upon,
and perhaps limited to, the result of our criminal procedure, the
'fair trial'. This is very largely achieved by the illogical and
otherwise irrational development of the law of evidence so as to
exclude relevant material, in order to protect the accused from
the assumed prejudices of lay jurymen and lay magistrates - the
prejudices of the professional being for some reason discounted.
It is perhaps the vague perception by members of the public of
the link between a political system which protects minorities
and a criminal procedure, developed by an independent
judiciary, which protects those accused of crime that has led to
the otherwise inexplicable furore which has greeted the
publication of the Report. For the Committee's avowed
intention is to diminish the protection afforded by the present
rules of evidence to a person accused of crime, and it is for that
reason that the Committee has been accused of diminishing the
chances of a 'fair trial'.
The more particular reason for opposition to the Report is
that it came at the end of a series of events which assumed an
importance to which they are barely entitled. First, the Lord
Chief Justice, in a widely criticised statement to the American
Bar Association, expressed the opinion that the presence of a
suspect's solicitor at police interrogation was "unacceptable".
Then the Lord Chancellor, in an address to the London
Criminal Courts Solicitors' Association, emphasised the need to
deal with the growth of crime. These remarks of high authority
appear to support the claim made by the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner in a much publicised lecture that clever and silent
professional criminals escape the consequences of their crime
because of the inadequacy of the criminal law. And the
Conservative Political Centre issued a pamphlet, The Conviction
of the Guilty, which accepted the Commissioner's view that too
many of the guilty escape. The Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee thus came to be thought of as part of a
conspiracy to improve the conviction rate by the same hard-line
approach as had already been advocated. A most unfortunate
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result has been the polarisation of views almost on partypolitical lines and certainly on primarily an emotive plane. The
Liberals and the Labour lawyers and the bodies professedly
concerned with individual liberty, on the one hand, are
campaigning4 against the Conservative Political Centre, the
Monday Club, the Police Federation and others who are urging
the Government to get on with a consideration of the Report.
Rationality of decision, it might be thought, is more likely to be
impeded than fostered thereby: we are in danger of having
slogans substituted for argument. This is not to say that a start
has not been made upon a rational critical appraisal of the
Committee's recommendations and of the assumptions on
which they are based, but these can more conveniently be
considered after the Committee's principal proposals have been
outlined.
2. PrincipalRecommendations
The Committee assumes that serious crime will continue to be
tried by a judge and jury and that the orality of such trials will
be preserved. It further assumes that, although in theory all
relevant evidence should be admissible and all witnesses
compellable, exceptions must be made where that would be too
prejudicial to the accused. The Committee, however, saw as its
"main object" the reduction of the exceptions to admissibility,
although it would none the less retain the present unfettered
discretion of the judge to exclude any evidence which is too
prejudicial to the accused.
Interrogationof the accused. It is not proposed to abolish
the 'right to silence', for a suspect may remain silent if he
chooses; but, as the Committee frankly remarks (p. 35), its
recommendations will "put a measure of compulsion upon
suspects to answer questions, even when they are in custody"
and "will therefore give some kind of statutory sanction to
police questioning". It is proposed that this should be done in
three ways. First, natural inferences may be drawn from
4. The National Council for Civil Liberties opened a "campaign" to
"stop" the Bill with a Press conference, to launch their pamphlet
Judgment on Justice and the issue of "action kits" to their branches,

which will "spearhead the attack".
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silence' in the face of interrogation or when charged 6 or from a
failure to give evidence at the trial.7 Secondly, the prosecution
may comment on a failure to answer or to give evidence.
Thirdly, such failure may constitute corroboration of other
evidence in respect of which it is material. The Committee
consequentially recommends the abolition of the caution now
given to suspects under the Judges' Rules and in its place would
substitute a written statement warning the suspect of the
consequences of - silence. It further recommends the abolition
of the Judges' Rules and in their place administrative directions
from the Home Office. The idea of interrogation before
magistrates is rejected, as is the proposal for the tape-recording
of police interrogation; but a majority recommended experimenting with tape-recording, while a minority would suspend
the Committee's recommendations until such a safeguard had
been put into effect.
Confessions. At present, a confession is not voluntary if it
is obtained by oppression or by threat or inducement made by a
person in authority. It is recommended that a threat or
inducement made by anyone 8 shall have this effect. A more
important proposal, however, is that a threat or inducement
shall not render a confession involuntary unless that threat or
inducement were "likely to produce an unreliable confession".
Evidence of disposition. We are told that this point was
most divisive of the Committee and of those whom it consulted.
It seems equally to have divided those who wrote the report,
since the recommendations are described as "minor changes"
(para. 70) and "substantial amendments" (p. 214). In effect,
the present law, based on the similar fact principle, is retained,
but an important exception is proposed. Where the accused
admits the actus reus, evidence of disposition shall be admissible
5. When the accused has failed to mention a fact which he could

reasonably have been expected to mention, the court or jury may draw
such inference as appears proper.
6. But no inference shall be drawn in the exceptional case of
interrogation after charge. Why not?
7. The prosecution may also comment on the failure of the accused's
spouse to give evidence.
8. Presumably this would include a co-suspect. If so, is it enough that
one suspect says to another, 'Make a statement so that we can leave the

police station'?
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to show the necessary state of mind or to rebut a defence of
accident or lawful justification or excuse. This is an important
proposal, if there is anything in the conclusion reached by the
Oxford University's Penal Research Unit that seven out of every
ten accused admit the basic facts and their involvement in
them. 9
Evidence by the accused. Pressure is to be put on the
accused to induce him to give evidence (v. sup.); and, if he does,
his testimony must be on oath. The Committee suggests the
re-writing of the circumstances (at present set out in s. 1 (e) and
(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898) in which he may be
cross-examined about his past; but the Committee accepts a
compromise, like that of 1898, between the extremes of fully
protecting the accused and treating him as an ordinary witness.
In future, he will be open to cross-examination and subject to
the introduction of counter-evidence of disposition or reputation even if he suggests only indirectly'" that he is of good
character. But (in favour of the accused) it is recommended
that, where he makes an imputation on the prosecution (or a
prosecution witness), he shall be liable to cross-examination as
to his past only if the "main purpose" of the imputation was
"to raise an issue as to the [prosecution] witness's credibility".
Thus, an imputation necessary to his defence will no longer let
in evidence of his past.
Burden of proof on the accused. Here again, a recommendation in favour of the accused is made. At present, any
burden placed on the accused at common law (except for
insanity) is evidential only; but statutory burdens are usually
persuasive. It is now recommended that (with two minor
exceptions) the accused's burden shall never be more than
evidential (even in cases of insanity or diminished responsibility).
9. It is suggested in 122 NLJ 646 that this "puts the kibosh" on the
Committee's proposal. But the Oxford Report shows, not that the accused
were innocent, but that, under the present rules of evidence, they were
acquitted. This conclusion would seem to point equally to the need to
change the law of evidence.
10. This proposal has been called "at best petty and at worst
vindictive": [1972] Crim. L.R. 468. The change will perhaps not be so
important as might appear, for an attack on an accused's character often
leads to sympathy from the jury, rather than the reverse.

Reform of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 157

The accused's spouse as witness. It is proposed that the
accused's spouse be compellable for the defence in all cases, but
for the prosecution only in cases of violence to herself or a
sexual offence against a child under 16 or the same household.
If the spouses are no longer married, they will be compellable as
if they had never been married.
Corroboration. The Committee recommends that corroboration shall not be required as a matter of law in the case of
accomplices, but the judge shall decide whether to 'warn' the
jury or not. In the case of sexual offences, corroboration shall
be required by law where the victim is below the age of
fourteen, but in other cases it shall be sufficient for the judge to
warn the jury of a "special need for caution".' ' Corroboration
shall be required in cases of perjury only where that perjury was
in court, but corroboration of evidence of speeding will still be
required. In cases of identification, the judge will have to warn
the jury of the "special need for caution". This last is termed
"the important innovation" (para. 475); but perhaps the most
important innovation is the proposal that the accused's silence
on interrogation, on charge or on trial may account to
corroboration: his negative act is to afford positive proof.
Hearsay. The draft Bill contains more on this subject than
on any other, yet the critics have been silent. The Committee's
claim to have made "large inroads" into the rule is no
understatement. Generally speaking, first-hand hearsay will be
admissible, but second-hand hearsay (except for statements in
other legal proceedings) will not. This means, for instance, that
the prosecution will be able to give evidence of a statement
made by one co-accused implicating the other, even if the
co-accused are husband and wife being tried jointly (para. 252).
3. Criticisms
The Committee's composition and method of work: Critics
complain that the Committee contained no criminologist,
sociologist or lay magistrate. This is the more significant by
reason of the fact that it relied on its own and on colleagues'
impressions and the opinions of foreign experts. This in turn is
11. This coincides with the recommendation that a child's evidence
shall be unsworn before the age of 14 but sworn if of that age or above.
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the more significant by reason of the fact that it proceeded on
the basis of assumptions founded on these impressions and
opinons without any attempt at empirical investigation. This
lack of research is the major objection taken to the Committee's
modus operandi, though it may be remarked that its assumptions are now assailed by critics who have themselves done as
little research. Moreover, on many matters for which critics call
for 'facts', it is difficult to see how they could be obtained. For
instance, the Committee says that opinions differ as to how far
the Canadian treatment of the accused as an ordinary witness
operates to deter the accused from giving evidence. On this, the
comment has been made 1 2 that we require "rather less
estimation of opinion and very much more ascertainment of
fact". But what sort of 'fact' is obtainable? Why assume that
those accused of crime could or would give accurate information on such a matter? Similarly, the Committee has been taken
to task for assuming, without research, that professional
criminals are acquitted because of defects in criminal procedure
and evidence. But, again, what 'facts' would research elicit? In
these matters, which cannot be expected to go beyond
impressions, the Committee's reliance on opinion is justified as
inevitable. The inconclusiveness of the conclusions of 'research'
is, indeed, demonstrated by the excessive weight sought to be
given to the inferences to be drawn from the Oxford University
Research Unit's paper on acquittals.
The 'right to silence' It is proposed to deal with this
separately, because it is the vital question and most criticism has
been directed to it; for if injustice occurs before the trial, it is
immaterial how just is the trial procedure itself. 13 At present,
the 'right to silence' is the law's method of protecting the
accused from police oppression. It may not be logical. It may
not be very effective, since most juries will be suspicious of an
accused who remains silent on interrogation, on charge or on
trial.' ' If, therefore, protection against police oppression could
be afforded aliter, it would be preferable. Hence the critics'
12. 35 M.L.R. 621.
13. See 122 N.L.Jo. 573.
14. For this and the further reason that most accused give evidence,
the suggestion that the prosecution may comment on the accused's silence
will, one suspects, have little practical effect.
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emphasis on the fact that the Committee nowhere remarks on
the accused's right, under the Judges' Rules, to see a solicitor.
The objection to the presence of a solicitor during interrogation
is that he is not an independent person and would be likely to
advise silence.' s This is not an easy question, as can be seen by
the fact that the Lord Chief Justice has objected to the presence
of a solicitor, yet expresses his uneasiness at prosecutions based
on police 'verbals' (i.e. oral statements attributed to the accused
by the police). Sir Brian McKenna 1 6 has argued that, since most
suspects are in some way connected with the offence, they may
well have something to explain away and should have legal
advice to do so.' 7 Sir Brian urges the retention of the Judges'
Rules1 8 and of the caution, on the ground that the caution
serves two purposes: to make it more likely that a confession is
voluntary and to inform the suspect of his rights. The latter
purpose is equally served by the written warning proposed by
the Committee, but that warning may increase the possibility of
an involuntary confession, for (pace the Committee) it may well
be regarded as a threat.
If a solicitor is not to be present during interrogation, the
arguments in favour of tape-recording are strong, although the
presence of the machine may not only inhibit the accused but
also lead to formalising the process of interrogation, which is
better left informal. Moreover, the status of untaped statements
(for instance, on the way to the police station) would remain a
difficult question. But if the danger of police oppression were
removed in some way such as this, there would seem to remain
no argument in favour of a 'right to silence'.' 9 There would

15. It has been suggested that disciplinary action by the Law Society
would be a sufficient remedy for this. Paradoxically, those who believe
this do not believe that disciplinary action by the police authorities would
equally be a remedy for police impropriety.
16. [1972] Crim. L.R. 605.
17. The proposed abolition of the right to see a solicitor, as expressed
in the preamble to the Judges' Rules, would make little or no difference, if
there is any truth in the suggestion (122 N.L.Jo. 805) that in practice the
police prevent the accused from seeing a solicitor until it is too late.
18. Which some critics would prefer to see in statutory form.
19. It has been suggested that it is unfair to treat a failure to mention a
fact as significant, if the police have not asked a question about it. This
can apply only in cases where they know of the fact; their failure in these
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then arise, however, the question whether, if the accused were
thus forced to show his hand, the prosecution ought not equally
be forced to show its hand by pre-trial discovery to the accused
of what information it has.2 0
The Committee's assumptions. In the first place, it assumed
that the law is ripe for reform on the ground that major changes
have been made, improving the position of the accused, since
the rules of evidence protecting the accused were founded. It
has been pointed out 2 ' that the prosecution has also improved
its position and is immensely more powerful. This is undoubtedly so, but the prosecution's power has increased outside the
trial; even though in the trial itself, the Committee's assumption appears to be valid. This would seem to case doubt on
some of, but not all, the Committee's conclusions.
Secondly, Professor Dworkin has challenged the assumption that the law's object should be to secure that the result of
the trial is the right one. He asserts that this means that its object
should be the highest number of right results in the long run.
But, he argues, its aim should be to produce the smallest
number of convictions of the innocent. 2 2 If, however, one
considers, not trials 'in the long run', but each individual trial as
a separate entity, there would appear to be no objection to
saying that a 'fair' trial is one aimed at producing the 'right'
result. In the concept of a 'fair rent',2 3 one is not concerned
with averaging over all the rents and asking whether they are
'fair' 'in the long run': one is concerned with each rent in turn.
Professor Dworkin seems to fall into the same error as that of
the Member of Parliament who said, 'When I say a fair rent, I
mean one fair to the tenant'.
The Committee's assumption that law is not a game and
that an accused should not be allowed to escape by reliance on
technical rules has been subjected to an all-out attack by Sir

circumstances will be evidence of the 'reasonableness' of the accused's
equal failure and will sterilize any 'inference', as not a 'proper' one to draw
in the circumstances.
20. See 122 N.L. Jo. 996: cf. 11972] Crim. L.R. 465.
21. 35 M.L.R. 621; cf. [1972] Crim. L.R. 465, where the Editor

speaks of the prosecution's practicaladvantages over the defendant.
22. The Times, July 3, 1972.
23. Under the Rent Act, 1968 and the Housing Finance Act, 1972.

Reform of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 161

Brian McKenna. 2 4 The adversary system, he contends, is like a
game at least in so far as it is governed by rules. His thesis is that
each side is bound equally by the rules, since the prosecution
always puts forward its full case and the judge never bends the
rules in the accused's favour. This opinion, coming from a High
Court Judge concerned with criminal trials, is obviously worthy
of the greatest attention, though it is not (it would seem) the
opinion of the judicial members of the Committee. Certainly, it
is generally said (and semble, believed) that the prosecution
does not press its case as hard as the defence will do. If it does,
neither the judge nor the jury will like it and it is likely to have
its own condemnation.
Finally, there are the Committee's assumptions that the
crime rate is in some way connected with the efficacy of the
criminal process and acquittals are in some measure dependent
on defects in criminal procedures. These assumptions, which are
common to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner's call for a
reform of the law of evidence (supra) and many of the
Committee's proposals, are denied by most of those who claim
that the increase in crime has nothing to do with the way a
suspect is interrogated, charged or tried. But this denial seems
to argue too much. Common sense dictates that successful
convictions must deter at least some criminals and that
convictions of the guilty are more likely if the rules relating to
interrogation and trial are 'relaxed'. More dubious seems the
Committee's assumption that it is the professional criminal who
escapes under the present rules.' s
Some criticism has proceeded on the basis that the
Committee assumed that its task was to assist in the fight
against crime. But the Chairman of the Committee has been at
some pains to emphasise that this was not the object of the
Committee.2 6 Its recommendations were intended to secure
"the fair and efficient administration of justice". This presumably means the conviction of those proved guilty and the
24. [1972] Crim. L.R. 605.
25. The argument that only the low-grade criminal will fall within the
mesh of the proposed changes is hardly conclusive. The petty thief, known
to the police, who cannot be convicted until he is in the position of asking
for numerous other petty offences to be taken into account might be
stopped in his tracks a little earlier, under the changes proposed.
26. See The Times, September 29, 1972.

162 The Dalhousie Law Journal

acquittal, not simply of the innocent, but of those not proved
guilty. It might be argued that it is logically indefensible to use
the laws of evidence (as the Common law does) to afford special
protection for the accused, since everything capable of proof is
in some measure relevant to the proof of facts. Indeed, the
French so argue; 2 7 they afford the accused such protection as
policy dictates by certain institutional devices. While we
continue to protect the accused by the rules of evidence, the
question to which the Committee's Report gives rise is whether
it recommends a sufficient number of exceptions to the general
principle that all relevant evidence should be admitted.
Conclusion. The Committee's proposals constitute, in a
sense, no more than an interim measure, since they are based on
the assumption that the law of evidence will be codified by the
Law Commission. Looked at in this light, it may be thought
that many of the proposals, taken separately, are worthy of
immediate enactment, even if the sum total, looked at as a
package deal, appears unattractive to many. If the proposals
came to be considered piecemeal, the test for each might well
be: - is there any chance that it will increase the possibility of
convicting the innocent? Few, it may be thought, would reject
such a test; but even complete agreement on the test would be
unlikely to bring us nearer to agreement on its application.
Many (but not all) libertarians argue that the inevitable result of
most of the proposals is to increase the risk of convicting the
innocent; others have claimed even that the chances of wrongful
conviction will be marginally less.2 8 This must remain a matter
of impression: on such impressions the progress of the
Committee's proposals will depend.
27. See M. Manfred Simon's letter to The Times, October 5, 1972.
28. See 136 J.P. 426; 711; 781.

